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Labour Market Institutions and Skill Premiums:  
An Empirical Analysis on the UK 1972-2002 
 
Wage premiums of highly educated workers have substantially increased since the 
end of 1970s in the United Kingdom. Rising wage differentials between education 
groups have been identified as key feature of rising wage inequality in the UK and 
other OECD countries (Acemoglu and Autor, 2010, Gosling et al., 2000, Lindley and 
Machin, 2011, Atkinson, 2007). The existent literature has tried to isolate the causal 
factors underpinning these market changes. The most popular candidates may be the 
skill-biased technical change (SBTC) and increased international trade.  
First of all, there is strong evidence of the empirical association between 
proxies for SBTC (computers or other Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) facilities) and the widened wage gap of the UK and US in the 1980s (Katz and 
Autor., 1999, Krueger, 1993, Machin, 2001, Machin and Van Reenen, 1998, 
O'Mahony et al., 2008, Perugini and Pompei, 2009). Moreover, the trade explanation 
focuses on changes in product demand largely associated with large trade deficits in 
the 1980s. Wood (1994, 1995, 1998) argues that the growth of manufacturing imports 
from newly industrializing economies have led to a sharp decline in unskilled 
manufacturing employment and a shift in employment toward other skill-intensive 
sectors. However, the trade explanation is not convincing for many authors (Krugman 
and Lawrence, 1993, Machin and Van Reenen, 1998, Sachs and Shatz, 1994, Schmitt, 
1995) who point that the effect of international trade on relative demand for skill is 
small. Ghose (2000) confirms that the growth of trade in manufacturing with some 
developing countries has certainly had adverse effects on employment and wage of 
low-skilled workers in the industrialized countries, but such effects have been quite 
small. Hence, on the whole the evidence seems to lean towards the SBTC explanation 
(Machin, 1996).  
At the same time, the widening wage gap in the UK has been accompanied by 
institutional reform in the labour market since Thatcher-era. Labour policy directed by 
US-style flexibility may be part of the causation of the widening wage structure. This 
paper aims to analyze the effects of changes in labour market institutions (such as 
trade unions, taxation, unemployment benefits and the national minimum wages) on 
the skill premiums, controlling for changes in technology and trade patterns. 
With the same access to technology and international competition, and having 
had a similar education expansion, the increasing skill premiums in the UK, in 
contrast to the stable wage structure in continental European countries can only be 
explained by a different institutional environment. Hence, Acemoglu (2003) argues 
that changes in the supply and demand for skills are unlikely to fully account for the 
marked differences in skill premiums across countries. The “Krugman hypothesis” 
states that the rise in wage inequality in the Anglo-Saxon countries as well as the rise 
in unemployment in continental Europe are “two sides of the same coin”, namely a 
fall in the relative demand for unskilled workers under different wage setting 
institutions (Krugman, 1994, Nickell and Bell, 1996, Puhani, 2008).  
A substantial amount of research on wage inequality has regarded and 
examined labour market institutions as important factors that may affect the wage 
response of markets to shifts in the relative demand for skills (Blau and Kahn, 1996, 
Card et al., 2003, Gottschalk and Joyce, 1998, Katz et al., 1995, Koeniger et al., 2007, 
Machin, 1996, Machin, 1997). One strand of this research has studied how specific 
labour market institutions affect wage differentials in the UK. First of all, the 
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possibility of there being a connection between the wage differentials and trade 
unions has been studied in a large literature. Casual inspection shows a striking 
association between movements in union density over time and changes in the 
earnings dispersion. Schmitt  (1995) has calculated that the decline in union density 
could account for 21 percent of the rise in the pay premium for a university degree 
and for 13 percent of the increase in the non-manual differential during 1978-1988. 
Machin (1997) obtains more dramatic results that the male variance would have been 
40 percent less if the 1980s levels of union coverage had prevailed in 1991. Bell and 
Pitt (1998) also conclude the deunionization between the early 1980s and 1990s 
widened the male earnings distribution by about 20 percent. Card et al. (2004) for a 
comparison of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, and Kahn (2000) 
for OECD countries have also found that higher union density is associated with 
lower wage inequality. This paper pushes the discussion further and focuses on the 
union effect on the skill premiums over the last three decades in the UK. 
Moreover, Dickens et al. (1999) and papers in the special session on the 
British minimum wages in the Economic Journal 2004 (Dickens and Manning, 2004, 
Machin and Wilson, 2004, Stewart, 2004, Metcalf, 2004) have found that national 
minimum wages reduce wage inequality by increasing the bottom deciles of the pay 
distribution without a negative impact on employment. DiNardo et al. (1996) and Lee 
(1999) also find the same effect of minimum wages for the United States. For other 
labour market institutions, tax wedges and unemployment benefits may affect skilled 
and unskilled workers at different degrees and change the skill premiums. Brewer et 
al. (2008) study about five million income tax returns covering the period 1996-2005 
and find that even though the current government has increased taxes on people with 
high incomes, this has not prevented them from racing further away from the average 
level of living standards across the country. They think that the outlook for inequality 
in Britain may depend more on the outlook for the stock market than on Government 
tax and benefit policies. Thus, this paper also investigates the different effects of the 
minimum wages, tax wedge and benefits on skill premiums. 
Most institution-specific research studies cross-section/longitudinal data at 
country level (Blau and Kahn, 1996, Koeniger et al., 2007, Wallerstein, 1999).  
However, the cross-country comparison cannot test for differences within a country, 
which is our contribution. No previous empirical study has tried to quantitatively 
assess respective importance of labour market institutions for workers with different 
education attainments. We construct a balanced panel data of six skill (education) 
groups over the period of 1972-2002 from several micro datasets, through which we 
investigate the effect of institutional factors on distinct skill groups and then skill 
premiums in the UK. This article is divided into four parts. The first reviews the 
theoretical models that motivate the estimated log-linear equation and provides our 
empirical specifications. The second part describes the main data sources and 
measures those variables, and the third represents empirical results. The fourth part 
concludes with a summary of the main findings and suggestions for policy. 
 
Empirical specifications  
In this part, we briefly review a union bargaining model provided by Koeniger et al. 
(2004, 2007), in which labour market institutions alter the outside options of skilled 
and unskilled workers differently and thus affect relative labour demand as well as the 
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wage differentials.
 1
 Changes of institutions as well as market conditions, technologies 
and international competition are reflected in the following skill premium equation: 
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where H denotes high skilled workers while L is low skilled workers. The skill 
premiums, i.e. log form gross wage differentials for skilled workers,  LH ww /ln , 
mainly depends on trade union density (tud), the tax wedge (tax), benefit replacement 
ratios (repr), unemployment rates (u), technology (comp) and international trade (ind) 
by skills, with the addition of the minimum wage variable (MW). Skill premiums 
depend on human capital and forgone earnings, and should be remarkably constant 
over the long run. However, short- and medium- run factors, including variables of 
institutions, market conditions, technology and international competition in equation 
(1) also affect skill premiums. Now, we go through the variables in the order they 
appear in the equation and present our arguments underlying equation (1) as follows.  
Koeniger et al. (2004) make union bargaining central to their derivation of 
equation (1), but many of their arguments hold in a competitive market as well, as we 
will explain. First, the skill premiums will be smaller if unions favour unskilled 
workers (tudL) more than skilled workers (tudH). And, the trade union bargaining 
model in Koeniger et al. (2004) regards earnings tax as a mark-up part of the gross 
wages for both skilled and unskilled workers. This result also holds in a competitive 
market model with individual bargaining. A similar analysis can be applied for 
unemployment benefit (repr) and unemployment rates (u) in equation (1): higher 
replacement ratios for skilled workers (reprH) increase the skill premiums, while 
higher replacement ratios for unskilled workers (reprL) decrease it. And, higher 
unemployment rates for skilled workers (uH) are likely to decrease the skill premiums, 
while higher unemployment rates for unskilled workers (uL) are likely to increase it. 
The overall effect of unemployment benefits (or unemployment rates) on the skill 
premiums depends on a comparison between its respective wage effect on skilled and 
unskilled workers. 
Second, as DiNardo et al. (1996) reveals, a minimum wage can directly 
compress the skill premiums by binding wages of unskilled workers, whereas wages 
of skilled workers are not directly affected. Hence, the minimum wages will cut off all 
unskilled wages below it and make the skill premiums smaller.  
Last but not least, skill premiums are affected by medium and short run shocks 
from technology (such as computer usage, comp) and international competition (such 
as industrial shifts, ind) in the market. New technologies adopted by skilled workers 
(compH) increase their marginal products and push up the skill premiums temporarily, 
while new technologies adopted by unskilled workers (compL) also increase their 
marginal products but decrease the skill premiums. However, if new technologies are 
complementary to skills (Acemoglu, 1998), total factor productivity of skill-intensive 
sectors (for example, computer software industry) grows faster than labour-intensive 
sectors (for example, textile industry). Technology shifts may have higher wage 
                                                 
1
See Koeniger et al. (2004) for derivation details of this model. We omit employment 
protection legislation (EPL) in their model, since the EPL index has been stable in the UK for the last 
thirty years (Daniel and Siebert (2005), Figure 4 and 5). 
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effects on skilled workers than on unskilled workers and would push up the skill 
premiums.  
International competition from newly industrialised countries may decrease 
the price of labour-intensive goods, as well as the demand for unskilled workers. At 
the same time, excess demand abroad may increase the domestic price of skill-
intensive goods and increase the relative demand for skilled workers. Increasing 
international competition is good for skilled workers (indH) but bad for unskilled 
workers (indL). Thus, international trade effects on both skilled and unskilled workers 
are likely to increase the skill premiums. 
Our empirical work uses a two-step estimation procedure, which is designed to 
get round the Moulton (1986) problem of explaining earnings based on individual 
data with variables based on aggregate data.
2
 In step 1, we use all individual 
observations to estimate education wage differentials as proxies of skill premiums 
over time. This equation is given as: 
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where wit is the real gross hourly wage rate. Following the tradition of Blau and Kahn 
(1996), Dickens (2000), Gosling et al. (2000), Koeniger et al. (2004, 2007) and 
Schmitt (1995), we only concentrate on male full time workers (weekly working 
hours>=35). Yt denotes a year dummy representing the baseline group of workers 
without education qualification (NOQUAL); Bit denotes a dummy variable for workers 
with below O-level qualifications (BOLEV); Oit denotes a dummy variable for the O-
level group (OLEV); Ait denotes a dummy variable for workers with A-levels (ALEV); 
Hit denotes a dummy variable for workers with higher educational qualifications but 
not degrees (HIGHER); and Dit denotes a dummy variable for worker with degree 
equivalent or above qualifications (DEGREE). Xit is a vector of controlling variables 
that may influence wages including potential labour market experience (Katz and 
Murphy, 1992), marital status, ethnicity, tenure and region; and it is a random error 
term.  
Correspondingly, nt are the estimated coefficients of the NOQUAL group, 
which are the wages of this group in year t relative to their wages in the first sample 
year, 1972. Following the same method, bt, ot, at, ht and dt are the estimated 
incremental wage effects of the different education groups: BOLEV, OLEV, ALEV, 
HIGHER and DEGREE over the baseline group NOQUAL in the same year. We stack 
bt, ot, at, ht and dt in equation (2) to form a skill premiums variable sjt, which is the 
estimated skill premiums of education group j (j=b,…,d) relative to the baseline 
                                                 
2
 Moulton (1986) shows that individuals in the same year/area share some common component 
of variance that is not entirely attributable either to their measured characteristics (e.g., gender and age) 
or to any aggregate variable in the year/area. In this case, the error component in an OLS regression 
will be positively correlated across people in the same year/area, causing the estimated standard error 
of the aggregated variable to be downward biased. A similar two-stage procedure is used in the wage 
cyclicality (beginning with Solon et al. (1997)) and wage curve literature (Nijkamp and Poot (2005), p 
434). 
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NOQUAL group. Hence, a panel dataset is built to find the links between the skill 
premiums and labour market institutions in step 2: 
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   (j= b, o, a, h and d)       (3) 
 
where sjt are the estimated skill premiums for education group j in the year t, and 
labour market institutions indicators and those control variables of market conditions, 
technology,  and international competition are defined in equation (1). All variables of 
the baseline group (tudnt, taxnt reprnt, unt, indnt and compnt) are also put into equation (3) 
to control for changes in the baseline group. υj is a vector of education group dummies, 
υt are year dummies, and  υjt is the stochastic error term. 
Equation (3) assumes the existence of a long run equilibrium relation between 
skill premiums and institutions. Also, the adjustment should be contemporaneous. 
However, much literature shows an increasing trend in the skill premiums (for 
example, Gosling et al. (2000)) as well as a decline of trade unions since the 1970s 
(for example, Bell and Pitt (1998) and Disney et al. (1998)). Since our panel data 
cover the period of 1972-2002, the skill premiums of each group are probably non-
stationary (see ADF tests below). Hence a co-integration problem may exist in the 
links between skill premiums and institutional variables. If there is some inertia in the 
adjustment process a re-parameterisation of equation (3) - as in equation (4) below - 
might be preferable. Thus, we put an Error Correction Mechanism (ECM) into 
equation (3) to clear the long-term relationship between the level of skill premiums 
and level of institutions. We follow the approach used in Ammermueller et al. (2010), 
but only put the ECM in trade union density variables (tudjt and tudnt) since trade 
unions are regarded as the most important institutional factor in most of the literature 
and only union density variable shows non-stationarity over the last thirty years. The 
error-correction specification is: 
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Thus, in this specification, the long run equilibrium between the level of the 
skill premiums and level of trade union density is embodied in an ECM.  
 
Data description 
Skill premiums 
The principle data used in this paper comes from the series of the annual General 
Household Survey (GHS) from 1972 to 2002. The GHS is a continuous multipurpose 
survey of large random samples of households across Great Britain, conducted on an 
annual basis by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). The survey has been carried 
out continuously except for two breaks in 1997 when the survey was reviewed and 
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1999 when the survey was redeveloped. Hence, there are 29 years of data in this paper 
(T=29) over the period 1972-2002.  
We use the highest educational qualification earned by the respondent to 
measure the skill levels which are either vocational or academic (see more details in 
Schmitt (1995)). The wage variable used here is the real gross hourly earnings, 
deflated by the annual Retail Price Index (RPI) with 1995 as 100 which is also 
provided by the ONS. The wage variable is from a wage sample including all full-
time employees aged sixteen to sixty-six. “Full time employee” here is defined as 
workers (excluding employer and self-employed) with weekly working hours 
exceeding 35 hours. Self-employed workers, part time workers and those working 
without pay are excluded from the sample. Extreme cases of earnings are excluded. 
Therefore, in the first step regression based on equation (2), we have 138,103 
observations over the entire period, in which 114,491 workers are in the private sector 
while 23,323 workers are in the public sector. In the second step, we have 5×29=145 
observations in both sectors. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the second step 
regressions by skill level and private/public sector. For the private sector, skill 
premiums are higher in the groups with more education attainment as expected. The 
variation of degree premium (7.08 percent) is much higher than that of other groups, 
reflecting the dramatic increase of about 27 percent from about 56 percent in 1979 to 
about 83 percent in 1998 (also see panel A of Table 4). Skill premiums of the 
HIGHER group increase by about 13 percent over the same period of 1979-1998, 
which also have higher variation (4.59 percent) than medium skilled groups (ALEV, 
OLEV or BOLEV, around 2.9 percent) but to a less degree. These results are 
consistent with the findings in Walker and Zhu (2003, 2008) using the Labour Force 
Surveys (LFS). However, medium skilled groups in the public sector have much 
higher and more volatile skill premiums than those in the private sector, while degree 
premium is a little lower in the public sector. Actually, there is no increasing trend for 
skill premiums in the public sector. Thus, the worsening of wage inequality since the 
1970s is perhaps caused by the increasing skill premiums in the private sector, 
especially from the rapidly increasing degree premiums rather than changes of skill 
premiums in the public sector.  
Next, we use the GHS 1972-2002 to measure those institutional and 
controlling variables on the right hand side (RHS) of the Step 2 regression, combined 
with another three datasets: the Family and Working Lives Survey (FWLS 
1994/1995), the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS 1991-2002) and the UK 
Family Expenditure Survey (FES 1972-2002).
 3
 . Because our dependent variable 
(skill premiums) have mainly controlled potential labour market experience in the 
Step 1, we follow the Katz and Murphy (1992) to control the within experience 
composition biases of these RHS variables by using the fixed weighted average of 
eight experience sub-groups with skill and sector. Weights are the average 
                                                 
3
 The FWLS is a life and work history data, which provide retrospective and representative 
information about people living in Britain. The BHPS was designed as an annual survey of each adult 
(16+) member of a nationally representative sample of more than 5,000 households in the UK, making 
a total of approximately 10,000 individual interviews yearly. The FES is a continuous survey of 
household expenditure and income, which has been in existence since 1957. The FES was replaced by 
a new survey in 2001, the Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS). Thus, the last two years’ data are from 
the EFS 2001 and 2002, in which they have the same definition. We will not differentiate the two 
surveys in later discussion. 
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employment share of each experience sub-group over the entire period of 1972-2002, 
also following the tradition of Katz and Murphy (1992).
 4
  
 
 Institutions 
The main purpose of using these additional datasets is to compile a time series on 
union density by skill level. Information on union membership (tud) since the 1970s, 
along with worker’s characteristics is not available in any single British dataset. The 
GHS does not provide information about the trade union membership except in one 
year (1983). Our union density variable is from the FWLS for the period 1972-1994 
(Disney et al., 1998), and for the period 1995-2002, it is from the BHPS. Figure 1 
compares the trade union density changes in different datasets and illustrates a famous 
decline of trade union after the 1970s. The change of union density between 1991 and 
1995 is very similar in the FWLS and BHPS. This similarity shows that the union 
density has a consistent pattern between the two datasets. For the BHPS, the union 
questions were only asked for those who moved job in 1992-1994 (but for everyone in 
other years), so we did not include the period 1992-1994 in this figure and do not use 
these data in the analysis. We also compare our data of trade union density with the 
data from the Certification Office (The “Bain and Price” series, see Disney et al. 
(1998) and Bell and Pitt (1998)) and find that the consistency between datasets is 
satisfactory. 
More descriptive statistics of trade union densities are presented in Table 1 by 
skill and sector. The combination of the FWLS and BHPS reveals the trade union 
density in the medium skilled groups (BOLEV, OLEV and ALEV) is higher than the 
unskilled (NOQUAL) and high skilled groups (HIGHER and DEGREE) in the private 
sector, which is reasonable. For workers in all skill groups in the private sector, trade 
union density tends to decline after the end of 1970s, during which the skill premiums 
of the DEGREE and HIGHER move in the opposite direction. However, the situation 
in the public sector flips, in which union density of unskilled (NOQUAL) and high 
skilled groups (HIGHER and DEGREE) is higher than that in medium skilled groups 
(BOLEV, OLEV and ALEV). And, we do not find a clear decline of unions in the 
public sector since the 1970s. It is perhaps the reason for the different evolution of 
skill premiums in these two sectors. 
Moving on to the tax and benefit system, the private and public sectors are 
very similar to each other for these two variables, since the tax wedge and 
replacement ratios are actually irrelevant to sector. The little difference between two 
sectors is actually from within experience composition. Concerning the different tax 
wedge (tax) for skilled and unskilled workers, the GHS does not provide information 
about tax deductions from gross earnings. We therefore use the FES, which is a better 
dataset for tax expenditure. The FES 1972-2002 in fact provides tax wedges by skill 
level. The tax rate is defined here as the proportion of income tax deduction (Pay As 
You Earn amount) relative to normal gross wages. The theoretical model in Koeniger 
et al. (2004) implies that tax wedge is only a mark up factor on the gross wages. The 
relative tax wedge between skilled and unskilled workers should be positively 
correlated with the skill premiums. Table 1 shows that the tax wedge increases with 
skill levels reflecting the increasing tax rates according to “ability to pay” principle.  
As for benefit indices, they measure the proportion of unemployment benefits 
relative to average earnings before tax. The GHS provides information for 
                                                 
4
 Technique details are available if requested.  
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unemployment benefits over the entire period 1972-2000. After 1996, the British 
unemployment benefit changed its name to job seeker allowance. We will keep using 
the unemployment benefit term in the discussion. For practical purpose, we also put 
income support and incapacity benefit into our benefit indices since both of them will 
increase the outside option of workers.
 
Since the data about housing benefit (particular 
for council tax) are not consistent over time in the GHS, we do not include it. 
Moreover, a problem arises that unemployed workers can only provide the actual 
amount of benefit received not their earnings. Hence, the replacement ratios of 
benefits (repr) are estimated as the proportion of unemployment benefits they 
received relative to their estimated earnings in a standard earnings equation.  
On the other hand, the Koeniger et al. (2004) model implies that the 
replacement ratios should be negatively correlated with the skill premiums, if 
unemployment benefit is more generous for unskilled workers. Table 1 shows that the 
replacement ratios decrease with skill levels as expected. Brewer et al. (2008) argue 
that government has imposed large rises in taxation to fund higher benefit payments 
and tax credits after 1996. Hence, the combination of tax and benefit system may have 
larger effects and alleviate the wage inequality in recent years.   
As far as the minimum wages (mw) are concerned, the breakdown by skill and 
private/public sector is not necessary. The UK National Minimum Wage (NMW) Act 
came into force on 1 April 1999. We build a variable being zero before 1998, and 
taking the log form of national minimum wages after 1998 as a proxy for this policy 
change (Metcalf (2004), Table 1).  
 
International trade, technology and market conditions 
The unemployment rates of skill groups play an important role for the skill premiums 
because they represent the market conditions and outside options of workers with 
different education attainment. We calculate the unemployment rates only by skill 
level over the entire period using the GHS 1972-2002, similarly being due to its 
irrelevance to sector. The little difference between two sectors is also from within 
experience composition. Actually, we compare the unemployment rates in the GHS 
with other data sources such as the LFS and the BHPS, and find no much difference in 
these three data sources. Hence, we use the GHS here for consistency. The theoretical 
model of Koeniger et al. (2004) implies that there is a negative (positive) relationship 
between the unemployment rates of skilled (unskilled) workers and the skill premiums, 
ceteris paribus. Table 1 shows the different labour market conditions of skill groups. 
Obviously, the lower educated workers are more vulnerable when the labour market is 
loose. We also find that the unemployment gap between unskilled/medium-skilled and 
high skilled workers became wider in the 1980s and early years of 1990s. Higher 
unemployment rates of unskilled workers worsen their outside option and also 
decrease the collective bargaining power of their trade unions. Thus, the skill 
premiums should increase if the unemployment rate of unskilled workers increases 
faster than that of skilled workers. 
In the model of Koeniger et al. (2004), international trade and technology 
determine the skill premiums through relative prices and relative total factor 
productivity. In a two input × two industry world, as frequently used in the literature, 
the effect of international trade can be represented by the employment shifts from the 
manufacturing to the services as in Schmitt (1995).  In this paper, the proxy of the 
trade effect is the employment proportion of manufacturing workers within each skill 
group (ind). For its next, international competition may compress the product price 
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and profit of firms in traded sector, and decrease wages there. As more workers within 
one skill group shift from the manufacturing sector to the services, the pressure from 
international competition must be bigger.  
Table 1 shows the employment shifts mainly happen in the low skilled groups 
such as NOQUAL, BOLEV, OLEV and ALEV, which have continuous declines in 
manufacturing employment proportions. For workers in the high skilled groups of 
HIGHER and DEGREE, there is not much change in the manufacturing ratio. More 
detailed study shows that the manufacturing employment proportions even increase in 
high skilled groups in the early years of the 1980s, which may contribute to the 
increasing skill premiums in the 1980s.  
As for SBTC, we use computer usage density (comp) as a proxy. Computer 
usage is a widely applied measure of skill biased technology (Krueger, 1993). The 
disadvantage of this proxy is that the computer usage variable is not available before 
1984 in the GHS. As an alternative, we spliced into the series data from telephone 
usage using the telephone/computer ratio in 1984. This series gives the approximate 
computer usage in years before 1984. We have no information to divide the public 
and private sector, so this variable is the same for two sectors. As we expect, Table 1 
shows higher computer usage is associated with higher skill levels.  
 
Empirical results 
Basic results  
Table 2 presents the fixed effect results from equation (3) by the private and public 
sector.  We focus on the private sector which is the majority of the workforce. First, 
there are significant associations between the skill premiums and trade union density 
of skilled groups (tudjt) in the private sector. A point increase of trade union density in 
the skilled group will increase the skill premiums by 0.15 percent. As the theoretical 
model predicts, a point increase of trade union density in the baseline unskilled group 
(tudnt) will decrease the skill premiums by 0.21 percent, but this effect is not 
significant. Thus, our results suggest that trade unions have different effects on wages 
of workers at different skill levels.  
Second, the tax wedge shows a significant mark up effect for unskilled 
workers as the theoretical model predicts. A one point increase of the unskilled 
workers’ tax wedge (taxnt) decreases the skill premiums by about 1.7 percent. As the 
theoretical model predicts, the same change in the skilled workers’ tax wedge (taxjt) 
increases the skill premiums by about 1.03 percent, but insignificant. However, the 
benefit index has no significant effect on the skill premiums. Neither does the 
minimum wage variable show significant effects on the skill premiums in Table 2.  
Third, unemployment rates should reflect the business cycle and the outside 
options of workers. Workers can bargain more strongly if the labour market is tight. 
Yet, from Table 2, there is no significant effect of market conditions on the skill 
premiums. Solon et al. (1994) point out that more unskilled workers would join the 
employment as labour market is tight and push the overall wages down. Since 
employment composition within each education group also changes over the business 
cycle, it is not surprising to see insignificant effect of market conditions on skill 
premiums. Hence, the insignificant overall wage cyclicality here may just show the 
composition biases. 
As for other variables, we find significant effects of industrial shifts in skilled 
workers (-0.23) on the skill premiums. Moreover, the computer usage variables show 
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significant positive associations with workers’ wages, implying new technologies can 
improve productivity of all workers. A one point increase in computer usage of skilled 
workers (compjt) is associated with a 0.29 percent increase of the skill premiums, 
while that of unskilled workers (compnt) decreases about 0.57 percent of the skill 
premiums. This result suggests that adaptation of new technology for unskilled 
workers can help decrease the wage inequality.  
For all estimations in the public sector, there is no significant result except 
unemployment rate (0.69) and industrial shifts (1.45) of unskilled workers, implying 
more static skill premiums in the public sector. Wages of unskilled workers in the 
public sector can respond to the market condition and affect skill premiums, which is 
consistent with findings in Devereux and Hart (2006) and Peng and Siebert (2007). As 
the unemployment rates of unskilled workers increase, their wages decrease and push 
up the skill premiums. Similarly, more unskilled workers are employed in the public 
manufacturing increase the skill premiums. It seems that the wage setting in the public 
sector does not follow the model of Koeniger et al. (2004). Instead, bureaucratic and 
administered price models may be needed to explain wage management in the public 
sector (see a summary in Kaufman (2007) using transaction costs theory).  
 
Results of ECM specification 
The fixed effect results in Table 2 would be biased by co-integration problems if the 
skill premiums and trade union density were non-stationary. Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) Unit root test shows that the degree premiums in the private sector are 
non-stationary over the entire period, even more non-stationary during the period 
1979-1998. And, trade union densities of all education groups in the private sector are 
non-stationary over the entire period.
5
 Hence, results in Table 2 may be biased by co-
integration problem. Table 3 tries the fixed effect ECM model using the better 
specification in equation (4). This improvement in methodology clears up the long 
term relationship between institutions and the skill premiums. The main improvement 
is that institutional effects on the skill premiums are more important and significant in 
the private sector. A one point increase of trade union density in the skilled group 
(tudjt) still increases the skill premiums by 0.18 percent. However, the effect of trade 
unions on skill premiums becomes bigger and significant for unskilled workers. A one 
point increase of trade union density in the unskilled group (tudnt) will decrease the 
skill premiums by 0.59 percent. The tax wedge shows the right mark up effect as the 
model expects, but insignificant; the benefit variable of high skilled workers (reprjt) is 
also insignificant as in Table 2. However, the benefit variable of the unskilled group 
(reprnt) becomes significant. One point increase of benefit variable of unskilled 
workers can decrease the skill premiums by about 0.39 percent.  
Moreover, as the theoretic model predicts, unemployment rates of skilled 
workers (ujt) now show a negative association with the skill premiums (-0.47). Hence, 
the higher unemployment rates of skilled workers bring down their wages and 
decrease the skill premiums. This is consistent with the model of Koeniger et al. 
(2004) and the wage cyclicality literature. More skilled workers are employed in 
                                                 
5
 ADF test shows that the degree premium is non-stationary over the entire period (t value:-
2.68, MacKinnon p value: 7.8%), especially during the period 1979-1998 (t value:-1.60, MacKinnon p 
value: 48.4%). Skill premiums of other groups are all stationary over the entire period. Trade union 
densities of all groups are non-stationary over the entire period (t value: -0.55 for NOQUAL, -0.199 for 
BOLEV, 0.709 for OLEV, -0.834 for ALEV, -0.324 for HIGHER and -0.624 for DEGREE). Thus, the 
co-integration problem is serious for the regression, especially for specific skill groups and sub-periods.       
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manufacturing will decrease the skill premiums (-0.24) in the private sector. The 
technology change also shows the right direction for both skilled (0.26) and unskilled 
groups (-0.44). More computer usage in the unskilled workers appears to increase 
their wages and decrease skill premiums.  
For the public sector, we find that trade union density of unskilled workers is 
negatively associated with skill premiums in long run (-0.4), but positive in short run 
(0.64). The long term and short term of effects of trade union offset each other for 
unskilled workers and keep the skill premiums sticky in the public sector. Hence, 
skilled workers in the public sector seems not benefit much for wages from their trade 
unions. Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that trade unions compress wages of skilled 
members to compensate unskilled members (in the public sector, skilled and unskilled 
are to a large extent in the same unions, e.g. Unison). Another interesting point 
worthy of mention is the ECM variable, which is the lagged skill premiums variable, 
sjt-1. Its coefficient is 0.71 in the private sector but around 1 in the public sector, and 
both significant. This result confirms our argument that the short run wage 
adjustments in the private sector are more rapid than in the public sector. In fact, there 
may be no ECM in the public sector since the skill premiums there appear to be static. 
A compensation model as in Acemoglu et al. (2001), or a bureaucratic and 
administered price model as in Kaufman (2007) may be better for explaining wage 
management in the public sector. 
 
Contributions to the degree premium 
Table 4 estimates the contribution of each explanatory variable to the changes of the 
degree premium over three typical periods: 1972-1979 and 1979-1998 and 1998-2002. 
All figures in Table 4 are calculated by using coefficients in Table 3. For simplicity, 
we only concentrate on the institutional effects on the degree premium (as a proxy to 
earnings inequality) in the private sector and ignore insignificant estimates in Table 3 
The top panel shows changes in degree premium and those explanatory 
variables for both groups: NOQUAL and DEGREE. The middle panel shows effects 
of each explanatory variable on the degree premium. The bottom panel is the overall 
contribution of explanatory variable in different period. In analysis below, we 
concentrate on the long period 1979-1998, during which the degree premium has 
increased to the highest value in 1998. 
From Table 4, we can find the decline of trade union is the most important 
factor for the increasing degree premium during the period 1979-1998. The union 
decline in the DEGREE group (-30.75 percent) decreases the degree premium by 
about 5.53 percent (=0.18×30.75). At the same time, however, trade union density 
decline in the unskilled group (NOQUAL, -25.29 percent) increases the degree 
premium by about 14.92 percent (=0.59×25.29), that is, about half of total rise in 
degree premium (27.4 percent). Hence, the union decline in these two groups has a 
combined positive effect of 9.39 percent (=14.92-5.53) on the degree premium, which 
can account for about 34.24 percent (=9.39/27.4) of the rise in degree premium. This 
result is consistent with literature on trade union effect on earnings inequality such as 
Schmitt (1995) (about 21 percent of the rise in degree premium), Machin (1997) 
(about 40 percent of the rise in male variance) and Bell and Pitt (1998) (about 20 
percent of the male earnings distribution). And, as Tzannatos and Aidt (2006) argues, 
the weak need trade union as their representation to improve their welfare more than 
those not weak.  
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Following the same way, we calculate the overall effect of the tax and benefit 
system. The increasing benefit replacement ratio in unskilled workers (6.54 percent) 
can reduce the degree premium by about 2.55 percent, which is about 9.31 percent 
(=2.55/27.4) of the rise in degree premium. The market condition variable (as a proxy 
of business cycle) and the industrial shifts variable can only account for a small part, 
3-4 percent of the rise in degree premium.  
Moreover, the increasing computer usage in the DEGREE group (61.21 
percent) increase the degree premium by about 15.91 percent (=0.26×61.21). At the 
same time, however, the increasing computer usage in the unskilled group (24.31 
percent) decreases the degree premium by about 10.69 percent (=0.44×24.31). Hence, 
the increasing computer usage in these two groups has a combined effect of 5.22 
percent (=15.91-10.69) increase on the degree premium, which accounts for about 
19.04 percent (=5.22/27.4) of the rise in degree premium during this period. Therefore, 
our results are consistent with the cross-country results of Koeniger et al. (2007), 
which claim “changes in these institutions can explain a substantial part of observed 
changes in male wage inequality — at least as much as is explained by our trade and 
technology measures.”  
 
Sensitivity Tests 
Results of sensitivity tests are summarised in Table 5. For simplicity, we only 
concentrate on the institutional effects on skill premiums in the private sector. Column 
(a) use weekly earnings as the dependent variable; Column (b) still uses hourly wage 
as the dependent variable and the six-skill-level framework, but only run the 
regression for two medium skilled groups (BOLEV and OLEV);  Column (c) only 
takes the results from years after 1979. Since both the degree premium and trade 
union density are non-stationary after 1979, we only test the fixed effect ECM model 
in equation (4) to avoid the co-integration problem. 
In column (a), equation (4) also works on weekly earnings. Trade union 
density of unskilled workers (-0.57) has bigger effect on the skill premiums than that 
of skilled workers (0.19). Hence, the similar decline in trade union for skilled and 
unskilled workers should increase the skill premiums. Moreover, unemployment 
benefits of unskilled workers can decrease skill premiums (-0.45), while that of 
skilled workers is insignificant. Thus, our conclusions from hourly earnings 
estimation still remain for weekly earnings. And this test suggests that weekly 
working hours are not sensitive to these explanatory variables. 
In column (b), a one point increase of trade union density in the medium 
skilled group (BOLEV and OLEV, tudjt) can increase the skill premiums by 0.23 
percent in long run and by 0.27 percent in short run, while a one point increase of 
trade union density in the unskilled group (tudnt) decrease the skill premiums by 0.31 
percent. Hence, the overall effect of union decline also pushes up skill premiums of 
medium skilled workers. 
As far as special periods are concerned, column (c) shows that the effect of 
trade union is much more prominent in the years after 1979, and only changes in trade 
union density of unskilled workers are important. A one point increase of trade union 
density of the unskilled group (tudnt) decreases the skill premiums by 1.58 percent. 
Unemployment benefits of unskilled workers can decrease skill premiums (-0.4), 
while that of skilled workers is insignificant. Thus, our conclusion from the entire 
period still holds for the special period of 1980-2002. 
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Conclusions  
This paper analyzes the links between labour market institutions and the skill 
premiums in the UK, controlling for labour market conditions, industrial structure 
shifts and skill-biased technology change. We find the institutional factors such as 
trade union, tax wedge and benefit system are very important for skill premiums. 
For the skill premiums in the private sector, institutions are more important for 
unskilled workers than those skilled. The trade union decline after 1979 is associated 
with different effect on wages of skilled and unskilled workers and pushes the skill 
premiums up. By using the fixed effect ECM model, we find that the trade union 
decline in unskilled workers can explain more than half of the rise in degree premium 
over the period 1979-1998. The overall effect of trade union in all workers can 
explain about one-third of degree premium increase in the same period. Trade union 
effect is also significant for skill premiums of low skilled workers and higher in years 
after 1979 than in the 1970s. Although the mark-up effects of tax wedge are not 
significant in this fixed effect ECM model, unemployment benefits of unskilled 
workers in the private sector reduce skill premiums by about 9 percent over the period 
1979-1998.  
For the public sector, we also find the significant effect of the trade union of 
unskilled workers on skill premiums. However, skill premiums in the public sector 
appear to be less responsive to institutional factors than in the private sector. A 
compensation model as in Acemoglu et al. (2001) or a bureaucratic and administered 
price model as in Kaufman (2007) might be better for explaining wage management 
in the public sector. 
Evidence from this study suggests that the decline of trade union has a 
profound impact on the wages of unskilled workers. The decentralization of wage 
setting institutions in the private sector withheld the wage growth of unskilled (often 
low-wage) workers who are left behind by their skilled counterparts. Wage setting 
institutions may be more inclusive for unskilled worker in the public sector, for 
example, cleaners and assistant nurses in public sector hospitals in Grimshaw (2009). 
The combined effects of more coordinated and renewed centralised system of wage-
setting institutions, more unemployment benefits of unskilled workers in the private 
sector and extension of public-sector terms and conditions to unskilled workers can 
decrease the earnings inequality in the UK.        
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 Figure 1 Trade union density in the UK, males 1972-2002 
    
Note: All figures are calculated from the GHS 1983, the FWLS 1994/1995 and the BHPS 1991-2002.  
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Table 1 Data description by skill and sector, 1972-2002 
1A. Descriptive statistics of variables in the private sector, by skill levels (%) 
Variables/ 
skill Levels 
NOQUAL BOLEV OLEV ALEV HIGHER DEGREE 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Skill premiums      9.00 2.90 16.81 2.81 27.90 2.87 41.49 4.59 67.21 7.08 
Trade union density  40.43 8.87 51.03 12.28 45.46 11.12 47.64 13.96 42.02 9.69 34.21 10.53 
Tax wedge  16.60 2.59 16.96 2.76 17.13 2.40 17.57 2.35 18.91 2.21 19.62 2.41 
Replacement Ratio 32.77 3.66 30.65 3.68 27.56 3.76 23.75 3.73 19.71 4.20 15.41 3.25 
Unemployment rate  12.21 5.44 7.98 4.16 6.70 3.62 5.25 2.73 2.76 1.69 3.14 1.61 
Manufacturing proportion  35.91 5.51 35.91 6.65 29.82 3.42 31.16 4.94 32.85 3.41 21.86 2.84 
Computer usage  16.85 14.63 21.12 17.78 25.18 20.44 28.90 23.25 31.09 24.23 34.97 27.49 
1B. Descriptive statistics of variables in the public sector, by skill levels (%) 
Variables/ 
skill Levels 
NOQUAL BOLEV OLEV ALEV HIGHER DEGREE 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Skill premiums      14.61 6.91 28.46 7.45 35.97 7.34 41.85 6.63 61.33 8.44 
Trade union density  59.10 7.52 43.28 9.60 43.46 9.51 41.82 13.79 66.42 8.96 65.47 6.57 
Tax wedge  16.74 2.67 17.05 2.76 17.37 2.46 17.74 2.32 19.16 2.23 19.92 2.42 
Replacement Ratio 32.59 3.97 30.49 3.97 26.92 3.87 23.44 3.75 19.48 4.19 15.41 3.25 
Unemployment rate  11.85 5.48 7.60 4.03 6.18 3.37 5.06 2.66 2.79 1.70 2.73 1.45 
Manufacturing proportion  35.93 5.77 35.82 6.99 30.21 3.26 31.27 4.63 31.86 3.24 21.36 2.84 
Computer usage  16.85 14.63 21.12 17.78 25.18 20.44 28.90 23.25 31.09 24.23 34.97 27.49 
Data source: GHS 1972-2002; FWLS 1994/1995; BHPS 1991-2002; and FES 1972-2002.  
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Table 2 Institutions and skill premiums, male 1972-2002, estimation from 
equation (3) 
Dependent variable: skill premiums  
(sjt, j = b, o, a, h and d) 
Private  Public 
Trade union density of skilled groups (tudjt)  0.15* -0.03 
(0.09) (0.06) 
Trade union density of unskilled group (tudnt) -0.21 -0.09 
(0.17) (0.15) 
Tax wedge of skilled groups (taxjt)  1.03 -0.15 
(0.82) (1.13) 
Tax wedge of unskilled group (taxnt)  -1.70** -0.80 
(0.84) (1.05) 
Benefit index of skilled groups (reprjt)  -0.13 -0.16 
(0.15) (0.19) 
Benefit index of unskilled group (reprnt)  -0.19 0.39 
(0.24) (0.25) 
Unemployment rate of skilled groups (ujt)  -0.25 0.50 
(0.28) (0.37) 
Unemployment rate of unskilled group (unt)  -0.01 0.69** 
(0.21) (0.31) 
Manufacturing proportion of skilled groups (indjt)  -0.23* -0.08 
(0.14) (0.17) 
Manufacturing proportion of unskilled group (indnt)  -0.23 1.45** 
(0.49) (0.32) 
Computer usage of skilled groups (compjt)  0.29*** -0.09 
(0.11) (0.16) 
Computer usage of unskilled group (compnt)  -0.57*** 0.50 
(0.19) (0.30) 
Minimum wages (MW) 1.08 - 
  (3.24) - 
Observations 140 140 
Groups 5 5 
R
2
 (within) 0.50 0.66 
Group dummies Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Year trend Yes Yes 
Notes: Estimated standard errors are under the coefficients. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels for two-tail tests. In the first step, we have 114,491 observations in the private sector 
and 23,323 observations in the public sector. In the second step, we have 5×29=145 observations in 
both sectors. Following the wage cyclicality literature (Solon et al. 1997; Peng and Siebert 2008), 
unemployment rates and unemployment benefit index have actually one year lag. Hence, we have only 
140 observations in step 2 regression.  
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Table 3 Institutions and skill premiums, male 1972-2002, estimation from 
equation (4) 
Dependent variable: growth rate of skill premiums (dsjt, 
j = b, o, a, h and d) Private  Public 
Lag of trade union density of skilled groups (tudjt-1)  
  
0.18** 0.03 
(0.10) (0.07) 
Growth of trade union density of skilled groups (dtudjt) 
  
0.12 -0.12 
(0.10) (0.07) 
Lag of trade union density of unskilled group (tudnt-1) 
  
-0.59*** -0.40** 
(0.26) (0.20) 
Growth of trade union density of unskilled group (dtudnt) 
  
-0.24 0.64*** 
(0.23) (0.13) 
Lag of skill premiums (sjt-1) 
  
-0.71*** -1.12*** 
(0.09) (0.10) 
Tax wedge of skilled groups (taxjt)  0.46 -0.01 
  (0.80) (1.11) 
Tax wedge of unskilled group (taxnt)  -0.72 -0.78 
  (0.95) (1.04) 
Benefit index of skilled groups (reprjt)  -0.05 -0.20 
  (0.15) (0.19) 
Benefit index of unskilled group (reprnt)  -0.39* 0.63** 
  (0.26) (0.29) 
Unemployment rate of skilled groups (ujt)  -0.47* 0.59 
  (0.28) (0.37) 
Unemployment rate of unskilled group (unt)  0.07 0.47* 
  (0.31) (0.30) 
Manufacturing proportion of skilled groups (indjt)  -0.24* -0.15 
  (0.14) (0.17) 
Manufacturing proportion of unskilled group (indnt)  0.15 0.38 
  (0.41) (0.35) 
Computer usage of skilled groups (compjt)  0.26*** -0.06 
  (0.11) (0.16) 
Computer usage of unskilled group (compnt)  -0.44*** 0.47 
  (0.17) (0.30) 
Minimum wages (MW) -  - 
   -  - 
Observations 140 140 
Groups 5 5 
R
2
 (within) 0.61 0.82 
Group dummies Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Year trend Yes Yes 
 
Notes: Estimated standard errors are under the coefficients. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels for two-tail tests.  
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Table 4 Contribution of explanatory factors to the degree premium,  
the private sector 
 
1972- 
1979 
1979- 
1998 
1998- 
2002 
4A. Changes of each variable (%) 
Degree premium (sdt) -17.67 27.41 -17.56 
Trade union density (tuddt) 4.55 -30.75 5.78 
Trade union density (tudnt) 8.41 -25.29 -1.29 
Tax wedge (taxdt) 3.83 -0.36 -0.55 
Tax wedge (taxnt) 3.40 -1.40 -1.32 
Benefit index (reprdt) -2.60 5.66 -3.97 
Benefit index (reprnt) -3.40 6.54 -2.13 
Unemployment rate (udt) -0.72 2.16 -0.42 
Unemployment rate (unt) 1.05 5.59 -4.29 
Manufacturing proportion (inddt) 7.72 -3.74 -4.18 
Manufacturing proportion (indnt) 0.38 -6.70 -4.42 
Computer usage (compdt) 11.83 61.21 16.57 
Computer usage (compnt) 3.96 24.31 22.49 
        
4B. Effects of changes in each explanatory variable (%) 
Trade union density (tuddt) 0.82** -5.53** 1.04** 
Trade union density (tudnt) -4.96*** 14.92*** 0.76*** 
Tax wedge (taxdt) - - - 
Tax wedge (taxnt) - - - 
Benefit index (reprdt) - - - 
Benefit index (reprnt) 1.32* -2.55* 0.83* 
Unemployment rate (udt) 0.34* -1.02* 0.20* 
Unemployment rate (unt) - - - 
Manufacturing proportion (inddt) -1.85* 0.90* 1.00* 
Manufacturing proportion (indnt) - - - 
Computer usage (compdt) 3.08*** 15.91*** 4.31*** 
Computer usage (compnt) -1.74*** -10.69*** -9.90*** 
4C. Overall contribution of each factor (%) 
Trade union density  23.45 34.24 -10.26 
Tax wedge  - - - 
Benefit index  -7.50 -9.31 -4.72 
Unemployment rate  -1.92 -3.71 -1.13 
Manufacturing proportion  10.49 3.28 -5.71 
Computer usage -7.55 19.04 31.82 
 
Notes: All figures in Table 4 are calculated using estimates in Table 3. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels for two-tail tests. Significance of each variable in the middle 
panel is from Table 3. 
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Table 5 Institutions and the skill premium (Sensitivity Tests), male 1972-2002, 
estimation from equation (4) 
Dependent variable: 
growth rate of the skill premiums  
(dsjt, j = b, o, a, h and d) 
( a) 
Weekly 
earnings 
( b) 
Semi-
skilled 
(c) 
1980- 
2002 
Lag of trade union density of skilled groups (tudjt-1)   0.19** 0.23* 0.14 
(0.10) (0.13) (0.15) 
Growth of trade union density of skilled groups (dtudjt)  0.11 0.27** 0.05 
(0.10) (0.12) (0.14) 
Lag of trade union density of unskilled group (tudnt-1)  -0.57** -0.31** -1.58*** 
(0.27) (0.16) (0.69) 
Growth of trade union density of unskilled group (dtudnt)  -0.22 0.01 -0.62 
(0.24) (0.13) (0.43) 
Lag of skill premiums (sjt-1) -0.64*** -0.68*** -0.82*** 
(0.09) (0.16) (0.11) 
Tax wedge of skilled groups (taxjt)   0.54 -0.45 -0.05 
(0.83) (0.42) (1.04) 
Tax wedge of unskilled group (taxnt)   -0.83 0.58 -0.51 
(0.98) (0.39) (0.57) 
Benefit index of skilled groups (reprjt)   0.00 0.03 -0.03 
(0.15) (0.16) (0.17) 
Benefit index of unskilled group (reprnt)   -0.45* 0.05 -0.40** 
(0.27) (0.18) (0.21) 
Minimum wages (MW) - - 1.66 
  - - (2.32) 
Observations 140 56 105 
Groups 5 2 5 
R
2
 (within) 0.58 0.60 0.58 
Group dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes No Yes 
Year trend Yes Yes Yes 
 
Notes: as for Table 2. 
 
